FLOOD PLAIN ZONING IN CALIFORNIAOPEN SPACE BY ANOTHER NAME:
POLICY AND PRACTICALITY

At a given moment in time, a city has two basic sets of resources.
There are its people, their talents, and their institutions, whether
business, public, or social. Its other stock in trade is its land surface, which amounts to a collection of locations, each with unique
characteristics. To a considerable extent, a city's future depends
upon its ability to induce people and organizations to use these locations to best advantage, from various standpoints: the functioning of the city's economy; satisfying the social, cultural, and aesthetic needs of the city's population; minimizing fiscal costs and
maximizing fiscal returns. These objectives are often in conflict
with one another.*

I.
INTRODUCTION
The uses allowed upon property subject to flood plain zoning restrictions are the type of uses that result in an increase of private
open space.' To the extent that development on flood-prone property in California imposes costs upon others in excess of benefits
conferred, inefficient land use is occurring.2 If these costs are recognized as the type of costs capable of being limited by zoning,
flood plain zoning can be an effective land use measure tending
to induce more efficient use of private property and can increase
an area's inventory of private open space.
There are few cases dealing with the constitutionality of flood

plain zoning, and no case has ever invalidated a flood plain zoning
* D. NETzER,ECONOMICS AND URBAN PROBLEMS 110 (1970).
1. As to the relationship between flood plain zoning and open space,
one only needs to consider a recent flood plain zoning case-Turner v.
County of Del Norte, 24 Cal. App. 3d 311, 101 Cal. Rptr. 93 (1972). Plaintiff's property was restricted to parks, recreation, and agriculture. (See
note 8, infra, and accompanying text). While this admittedly is not public
open space, it is open space for which a demand exists-less intensively
developed private property. The nature of this demand for private open
space is described in EcI o, DEAN, AusTnw AND WILLTms, OPEN SPACE:
THE CHOICES BEFORE CALIFoRNIA 17-19, 71-72 (1969).
2. Dunham, A Legal and Economic Basis for City Planning, 58 COLUm.
L. REv. 650, 659 (1958).
February 1973 Vol. 10 No. 2

ordinance in its entirety.3 However, several cases have refused to
apply a flood plain zoning ordinance to a particular litigant's property.4 These cases have established the constitutionality of flood
plain zoning, 5 given proper enabling legislation 6 and careful local

ordinance drafting. Allison Dunham, whose article on flood plain
zoning pre-dated most of the cases, accurately concluded a 1959 article by stating:
Land use regulation of flood plains with the objectives of preventing external diseconomies and protecting users from their own

purportedly inevitable irrationality in the assumption of flood risk,
presents an adequate basis to withstand attack under the due process clause of the constitution. Some particularordinances may fail
because of failure of the draftsmen to consider problems of equal
protection of the laws.7

A recent California case, Turner v. County of Del Norte,8 illustrates both the constitutionality and open space impact of flood
plain zoning. Turner upheld a county zoning ordinance restricting
plaintiff's use of his flood-prone property to parks, recreation, and
agriculture. Evidence established that the property had been
flooded four times since 1927, or an average of every eleven years.0
3.

1 UNITED STATES WATER RESOURCES COUNCIL, REGULATION

OF FLOOD

HAZARD AREAS To REDUCE FLOOD LOSSES 467-471 (1971). [hereinafter cited
as REGULATION OF FLOOD HAZARD AREAS]. This is a valuable publication
for those interested in flood plain, land use. It contains model enabling
statutes and ordinances, and discusses flood plain zoning in general.
4. Note especially Dooley v. Town Plan and Zoning Comm'n, 151 Conn.
304, 197 A.2d 770 (1964). For a recent case of interest, see Sturdy Homes v.
Township of Redford, 30 Mich. App. 53, 186 N.W.2d 43 (1971). Here, the
court refused to apply a flood plain zoning ordinance to Sturdy Homes'
property, because the area in question was not subject to flooding. However, the court specifically overturned the "Addendum Opinion" of the
trial court that voided the zoning ordinance as unconstitutional. In Morris
County Land Improvement Co. v. Township of Parsippany-Troy Hills, 40

N.J. 539, 193 A.2d 232 (1963), a zoning ordinance creating a Meadows Development Zone was declared invalid in full. This case is often cited as a
flood plain zoning case, however, in a footnote to the opinion, the court
distinguishes open space zoning from flood plain zoning and stated that the
decision was not meant to pass on the validity of flood plain zoning. Id.
at 242.
5. REGULATION OF FLOOD HAZARD AREAS, supra note 3, at 414-417. But
see Bartke, Dredging, Filling and Flood Plain Regulation In Michigan, 17
WAYNE L. REV. 861, 901 (1971). "The question of the constitutionality of
flood plain zoning remains unanswered and the issue is very controversial."
6. See text accompanying notes 24 through 43 infra.
7. Dunham, Flood Control Via the Police Power, 107 U. PA. L. REV.
1098, 1132 (1959) (emphasis added).
8. 24 Cal. App. 3d 311, 101 Cal. Rptr. 93 (1972).
9. Id. at 313, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 95. If this 11-year average is the true
average interval of flooding on this property, then this means a "recurrence interval" of 11 years. "It should be kept in mind that flood-frequency compilations and analyses of the type described yield values of a
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The court, concluding that the restrictions constituted a proper exercise of the County's zoning power, dealt in a conclusory manner
with the taking issue.
It is clear that there was sufficient testimony of the reasonableness of the ordinance in relation to the promotion of health, safety
or general welfare and prosperity of the community. (See Flood
Control Via Police Power, 107 Penn. L. Rev. 1098).
There was also evidence of a frequency of flooding which would
almost certainly eventually destroy any permanent residences built
on this land and endanger the lives and health of the occupants and,
further, that buildings in the flood plain property would increase
flood heights which could conceivably increase the hazard to other
buildings away from the zoned area.
The zoning ordinance in question imposes no restrictions more
stringent than the existing danger demands. Respondents may use
their lands in a number of ways which may be of economic benefit
to them.' 0

Turner does little to define the elusive boundary between a taking and proper exercise of the police power through zoning. However, considering the conclusory manner with which the court dealt
with the taking issue, the case is significant because it implies that
the restrictions imposed by the zoning ordinance were not approaching the outward permissible limit of flood zoning restrictions. What about applying these, or similar, restrictions to property where floods can be expected to occur every twenty-five years?
What about floods occurring every fifty or one-hundred years?
The purpose of this article is to determine both the outward permissible limit of flood plain zoning restrictions and the nature of
restrictions that may be imposed. This requires an investigation

of the extent and manner of expression of the policies underlying

flood plain zoning in California. Full utilization of flood plain
zoning, while justified only as a means of placing costs of development upon developers, has the practical affect of creating open

space. A local desire for open space underscores the costs of highly
intensive land use in the flood plain, and should be a motivating
factor in the decision to control land use within a flood plain.
parameter-recurrence interval. This is the average interval of time within
which a flood of a given magnitude will be equalled or exceeded but once.
It is also a statement of probability. Thus, a flood having a recurrence
interval of 10 years is one that has a 10% chance of recurring in any
single year." L. LEOPOLD, M. WOLMAN AND J. MILLER, FLUVIAL PROCESSES

(1964).
10. 24 Cal. App. 3d at 314-15, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 96.

IN GEOMORPHOLOGY 65-66

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OPEN SPACE AND FLOOD PLAIN ZONING

Support for the proposition that there exists a desire for open
space in California needs little 'documentation. The best evidence
of a State policy reflecting the desire is Article XXVIII of the
California Constitution, entitled "Open Space Conservation."'1

Population and land use projections for California indicate that
there will be increasing pressure on utilization of even marginal
land resources.
Development patterns are characterized by sprawl, scatteration,
San Francisco Bay filling, highway strip commercial sprawl, the
spatial merging of cities and urbanization of some of the finest
agricultural soils and specialty crop areas of the nation.
Urbanization of marginal lands subject to erosion, sliding, earthquake hazard and flooding12 is becoming a problem because of the
lack of land for expansion.
Despite the recognition of zoning as one method of accomplishing limited open space objectives, 13 it appears that courts are not
willing to accept zoning which has as its primary purpose open
space or natural area preservation. A series of recent cases can be
characterized as attempts to use a zoning approach to maintain
wetlands, coastal areas, or quasi-riparian private property in a natural open condition. The factual pattern of these cases is similar.
A property owner has desired to alter the natural condition of his
property by construction of residences or businesses. However, a
state or local government has desired to keep the property in its
unspoiled condition. Judicial reaction to these "open space through
14
police power" cases has been unfavorable.
11. CAL. CONST. ART. XXVIII, § 1. "The people hereby declare that it
is in the best interest of the state to maintain, preserve, conserve and
otherwise continue in existence open space lands for the production of
food and fiber and to assure the use and enjoyment of natural resources
and scenic beauty for the economic and social well-being of the state and
its citizens."

12. EcKBo, DEAN, AusTIN AND WILLIAMS, OPEN SPACE: THE CHOICES BEFORE CALIFORNIA

16 (1969).

13. Id. at 71.
14. Morris County Land Improvement Company v. Township of Parsippany-Troy Hills, 40 N.J. 539, 193 A.2d 232 (1963) (supra note 4), voiding a
Meadows Development Zone as an attempt to freeze property in its undeveloped condition. Commissioner of Natural Resources v. S. Volpe & Co.,
349 Mass. 104, 206 N.E.2d 666 (1965), refusing application of a state statute
attempting to maintain marsh areas in their natural condition. MacGibbon
v. Board of Appeals of Duxbury, 356 Mass. 635, 255 N.E.2d 347 (1970), refusing to apply zoning restrictions, which had as their purpose prevention
of despoilation of natural resources such as salt marshes, wetlands, brooks
and ponds, to MacGibbon's property. State v. Johnson, 265 A.2d 711 (Me.
1970), voiding application of a statute forbidding alteration of coastal wet-
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Two factors emerge as dominant in the rationale underlying
these decisions. First, the benefits accruing to the public are seen
as disproportionately large in comparison to benefits accruing to
the property owner. In State v. Johnson,a Maine court said:
The benefits from its [the litigant's coastal marsh property]
preservation extend beyond town limits and are state-wide. The
cost of its preservation should be publicly borne. To leave appellants with commercially valueless land in upholding the restriction presently imposed, is to charge them with more than their just
share of the cost of this state-wide conservation program, granting
fully its commendable purpose.15
The other dominant factor in these open space preservation cases
has been a comparison of the value of the property with and without the restrictions. For instance, in a Connecticut decisionBartlett v. Zoning Commission of the Town of Old Lyme' 6 -there
was evidence that the property, a tidal marshland, was worth
$32,000 without the restrictions, compared with $1,000 if the open
space zoning ordinance was allowed. This disparity in value provided the prime reason for the court's refusal to apply the restric17
tions.
Despite judicial reluctance to uphold zoning restrictions designed
only to preserve open space, a local desire for open space has important connections with flood plain zoning. First, many California counties and cities have not decided to zone the flood plain.' 8
lands. Bartlett v. Zoning Commission of the Town of Old Lyme, 161
Conn. 24, 282 A.2d 907 (1971), refusing to apply a zoning restriction
placed upon tidal marshland. State v. Johnson, 265 A.2d 711 (Me. 1970).
This case voided an injunction against filling coastal wetlands issued in
accordance with state environmental legislation. Bartlett v. Zoning Comm'n
of the Town of Old Lyme, 161 Conn. 24, 282 A.2d 907 (1971). Here, a
zoning ordinance was deemed to impose unconstitutionally severe limitations as to the property owner's use of his tidal marshland.
15. State v. Johnson, 265 A.2d 711, 716 (Me. 1970).
16. Bartlett v. Zoning Commission of the Town of Old Lyme, 161 Conn.
24, 282 A.2d 907 (1971).
17. Id. at 31, 282 A.2d at 910.
18. This article is concerned with whether a local agency has exercised
its option to zone the flood plain, and also with the extent of the restrictions. Listed below are the counties and cities of California that have
some form of flood plain zoning. No claim is made as to comprehensiveness. This list is taken from REGULATION OF FLOOD HAzARD AREAS, supra
note 3, at 496. Counties: Imperial, Sacramento, Napa, Riverside, Mendocino, Tehama, Alemeda, Stanislaus, and Del Norte. Cities: Riverside,
Sacramento, Palm Springs, Mountain View, Oceanside, Azusa, Manhattan
Beach, Chula Vista, Hayward, Los Angeles, Napa, and Fremont.

While it is obvious that the extent of flood risk varies in California, failure to regulate flood-prone land can mean two things.
First, a local agency might itself fail to recognize the cost of flood
damage. Alternatively, a failure to regulate land use in a flood
plain can imply tacit acceptance of the cost of flooding. Given a
strong local policy for open space preservation, and realizing that
flood plain zoning results in an increase of private open space, the
very existence of this demand should be a motivating factor in the
initiation of flood plain regulations. This follows, because a local
desire for open space properly focuses attention on the costs of
overly intensive land use in the flood plain, and these are the very
costs that justify flood plain zoning.
A second connection between a desire for open space and flood
plain zoning is the possible impact that this desire may have on
both the outward permissible limit and the nature of restrictions
that may be imposed. It has been noted that zoning based upon
more traditional aspects of the police power, but having substantial aesthetic overtones, is frequently upheld. 19 These decisions
thinly veil, if not an outright support of aesthetic zoning, at least
a tacit approval of the function of aesthetics in the zoning process.
Examples of this phenomenon can be found in the "billboard
21
cases" 20 and cases allowing minimum lot size restrictions.
It has been noted that this judicial permissiveness of essentially
aesthetic land use controls might actually be more profound in
California than in other jurisdictions.
Considering the traditional willingness of California courts to uphold police power regulation which demonstratably serve some
public purpose, it is difficult to conceive of a California court deciding a case like Morris County Land Improvement Co. v. Township
of Parsipany-Troy22
Hills (supra note 4) as it was decided by the
New Jersey Court.
In that case, the New Jersey court invalidated a zoning ordinance
creating a Meadows Development Zone, as an attempt to freeze
19. See generally Bowden, Article XXVIII-Opening The Door To
Open Space Control, 1 PAc. L.J. 461 (1970), and Steinbach, Aesthetic
Zoning: Property Values and The Judicial Decision Process, 35 Mo. L.
REv. 176 (1970).
20. Steinbach, Aesthetic Zoning: Property Values and The Judicial Decision Process, 35 Mo. L. REv. 176, 180 (1970), citing General Outdoor
Advertising Co. v. Dep't of Public Works, 289 Mass. 149, 193 N.E. 799
(1935).
21. Note, Zoning: Aesthetics: The Chameleon of Zoning, 4 TULsA L.J.
48, 59 (1967), citing Lionshead Lake Inc. v. Wayne Tp., 10 N.J. 165, 89
A.2d 693 (1952).
22. Bowden, Article XXVIII-Opening The Door To Open Space Control, 1 PAc. L.J. 461, 484 (1970).
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property in a natural, open, condition. 23 It is impossible to predict
the actual effect of this consideration upon flood plain zoning.
There is a possibility that these open space factors might represent,
to a limited extent, part of an unspoken rationale in upholding
marginally severe restrictions.
III.
THE

COBEY-ALQUIST FLOOD PLAIN MANAGEMENT ACT:
DEFINITIONs AND ENABLING LEGISLATION

24
In California, the Cobey-Alquist Flood Plain Management Act,
and the California Administrative Code sections adopted to implement the Cobey-Alquist Act, 25 provide the definitional framework
for this analysis. First, a flood plain "shall mean the relatively
flat area or lowlands adjoining the channel of a river, stream, watercourse, ocean, lake, or other body of standing water, which has
been or may be covered by floodwater."'2 6 If land borders a body

of water and is relatively flat or lowlands, it may be considered
part of the flood plain. It is not necessary that the land has been
flooded in the past, only that it may be in the future. It is also
27
significant that no outward limit of the flood plain is delineated.
The Cobey-Alquist Act divides the flood plain into two portions
-the "designated floodway" and the "restrictive zone." The first
portion closest to the stream channel is called the "designated
floodway," and is the area of the flood plain "required to reasonably provide for the construction of a project for passage of the design flood .... ',28 The design flood is the flood selected (e.g. 20year flood) either by a federal agency or a local agency (county or
municipality) against which protection will be provided by some
form of flood control project. 29 Adjacent to, or flanking the "designated floodway" is the "restrictive zone," which "means the por23. Morris County Land Improvement Company v. Township of Parsip-

pany-Troy Hills, 40 N.J. 539, 193 A.2d 232 (1963).
24. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 8400-8415 (West 1971), added by STATS. 1965,
c. 506, P. 1826, § 1.
25. 23 CAL. ADmVn. CODE §§ 200-242.
26. 23 CAL. AD1InN. CODE § 201(g).
27. Compare MINN. STAT. ANN. § 104.02 (1969), where the flood plain
is defined in terms of that area covered by the 100-year flood.
28. CAL. WATER CODE § 8402(f) (West 1971).

29. CAL. WATER CODE § 8402(c) (West 1971).

tion of the natural floodway between the limits of the designated
floodway and the limits of the flood plain where inundation may
occur but where depths and velocities are generally low.

30

A threshold question in any litigation involving zoning is the existence of enabling legislation authorizing local governments to
zone. 31 There is authority to support the contention that normal
zoning enabling legislation will support the constitutionality of
flood plain zoning, 32 and there is general language supporting flood
plain management in California zoning enabling legislation.3 3 However, the Cobey-Alquist Flood Plain Management Act represents
specific authority for local agencies to regulate land use in flood
plains. Flood plain zoning, as provided for in the Cobey-Alquist
Act is permissive, but encouraged. 3 4 It is mandatory only in the
sense that state financial assistance to local flood control projects
will be withheld if regulations in the "designated floodway" do not
exist.33

As to the "restrictive zone," a policy of complete permis-

30
siveness and deference to local policy is expressed.
In the "designated floodway," the Cobey-Alquist Act calls for
a prohibition of all structures which might endanger life or significantly restrict the carrying capacity of the "designated floodway."137 However, only general guidelines for permissible land use
controls within the "restrictive zone" are outlined. These general
guidelines call for development within the "restrictive zone" based
on local agency policy considering both the protection of human
life, and the carrying capacity of flood plain.38 The Administrative
Code interpreting this section of the Water Code, adds that optimum use of the flood plain is the goal, "taking into account the
need for the land and the flood hazard." 39
It is apparent, that not only is the decision to control land use in
the flood plain a local decision, but the nature of the restrictions
is sketchy and ambiguous, allowing a large degree of local discretion. The findings and declarations section of the Cobey-Alquist
Act provide some additional guidelines when imposing restrictions.
First, it is stated that a large portion of the state's land resources

30. CAL. WATER CODE § 8402(g) (West 1971).
31. D. HAGMAN, J. LARsoN Amn C. MARTN, CAIaFoRNTIA ZoiN=
§8 1.3, 1.4 (1969).
32. Id. at § 6.57.

33. CAL. GoVT. CODE § 65303 (West 1971).
34. CAL. WATER CODE 8 8401(c), (d) (West 1971).
35. CAL. WATER CODE § 8411 (West 1971).

36. CAL. WATER CODE § 8401 (West 1971).
37. CAL. WATER CODE § 8410(a) (West 1971).
38. CAL. WATER CODE § 8410(b) (West 1971).
39. 23 CAL. ADmiN. CODE § 222.

PRACTicE
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is subject to flooding which results in loss of life and property, as
well as disruption and interruption of commerce, transportation,
and communication. These effects of flooding are found to be detrimental to the health, safety, welfare, and property of the people
of California. 40 In addition, a state policy of flood plain regulation through a combination of flood control works and land use
regulation is expressed. 4 ' This dual approach to flood plain regulation is to be undertaken with the aim of prevention of loss of life,
42
and prevention of economic loss caused by excessive flooding.
As a policy directing device, enabling legislation for flood plain
zoning in California seems fully adequate because the ambiguity
of the act indicates an attitude allowing local discretion. In addition, regulations promoting reduction in flood damage detrimental
to persons' health, safety, welfare, and property are allowed. The
specific aims of flood plain management-prevention of loss of life
and prevention of economic loss caused by excessive flooding-encompass a wide range of policy objectives. While some of the specific policy objectives supporting flood plain zoning are not expressed in the Cobey-Alquist Act, the language of the act is broad
43
enough to embrace them.

IV.
How

OFTEN MUST IT FLOOD?

Having established that the California legislature has given local
agencies a broad policy foundation upon which to base flood plain
zoning restrictions, the problem remaining is to establish the outward limit of restrictions, and the type of restrictions that may be
imposed. Because of the scarcity of cases, and because the decided
cases are clouded with ancillary issues, they cannot be combined to
40. CAL. WATER CODE § 8401(a)

(West 1971).

41. CAL. WATER CODE § 8401(b) (West 1971).
42. CAL. WATER CODE § 8401(b) (West 1971).
43. Examples of policies supportive of flood plain zoning not specifically included in the Cobey-Alquist Act are (1) flood plain zoning will reduce instances of land purchasers being victimized by fraud and (2) flood
plain zoning will relieve the psychological burden placed on a community
from seeing members of the community victimized by disaster. See gen'erally Dunham, Flood Control Via the Police Power, 107 U. PA. L. REV.
1098 (1959), and Note, Flood Plain Zoning For Flood Loss Control, 50 IOWA
L. REV. 552 (1965).

delimit the contours of these outer limits. 44 Also, little help is
provided by writers discussing flood plain zoning suggesting permissible limits. One author stated: "To bar substantial development on areas of the flood plain which have a flood frequency of
seventy-five years would impose too great a burden." 46 Others
say: "A 100-year frequency is a commonly chosen basis for regulation."48 These suggestions are untested, and provide little help
in resolving the problem.
Additionally, there are economic generalizations that fail to resolve the problem because of a lack of specificity. "Regulations
should guide flood-susceptible uses away from flood-prone lands
only if production of goods and services is possible on nonflooded
land at less total cost to society than production on flood-prone
lands.147 Few would quarrel with the accurateness of this formulation. However, the translation of this benefit-cost formulation
to zoning maps consistent with the body of law that has defined
(or failed to define) 48 the limits of permissible restrictions is not
possible.
First, benefit-cost formulations have no constitutional basis as a
means of imposing zoning restrictions, because certain costs to society, imposed as a result of inefficient land use, are not legally
controllable through zoning. Thus, if a careful analysis shows that
a parcel of flood-prone, private, property has as its optimal use a
public park, local agencies may not zone the parcel for that use.
To do so would overstep the permissible limit of zoning and constitute a taking.49 Secondly, many of the costs resulting from a
flood and many of the benefits accruing to society from various
uses defy quantification. It is one thing to measure the cost of
repairing a flood damaged building, and quite another to place
dollar values on such factors as the psychological "cost" of seeing
community members victimized by natural disasters. 0 For these
44. For a collection of these cases see REGULATION OF FLOOD HAZARD
AmEAs, supra note 3, at 467-71. Consider Sturdy Homes Inc. v. Township of
Redford, 30 Mich. App. 53, 186 N:W.2d 43 (1971), where the property
was simply not subject to floods.
45. Beuchert, Zoning on the Flood Plain, 49 A.B.A.J. 258 (1963).
46. REGULATION OF FLOOD HAZARD AREAs, supra note 3, at 83.
47. Id. at 292.
48. See generally Van Alstyne, Taking or Damaging By Police Power:
The Search For Inverse Condemnation Criteria, 44 S. CAL. L. REv. 1
(1971).
49. D. HAGMAN, URBAN PLANNING AND LAND DEVELOPMENT CONTROL
LAW § 180 (1971).
50. This is a frequent problem in benefit-cost analysis. See Hammond,
Convention and Limitation In Benefit Cost Analysis, 6
(1966).

NAT.

RsS. J. 195
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reasons, a benefit-cost formulation provides little help in delineating zone boundaries.
The usual test of zoning ordinances is to require a litigant contesting the ordinance to show that the regulations imposed are not
rationally related to the regulatory objectives. 51 This concept is
expressed in Turner: "The zoning ordinance in question imposes no
restrictions more stringent than the existing danger demands. '52
Combining this dicta in Turner and the rational relationship requirement, a test for flood plain zoning ordinances may be formulated. Flood plain zoning should impose no restrictions more
stringent than the existing flood danger demands. However, this
statement also suffers from a lack of specificity and must be more
fully developed.
The initial question to answer is, may restrictions within the area
designated the "flood plain" be uniform within that area, or should
there be a decrease in the severity of restrictions as one moves into
areas of the flood plain where the probability of flooding is less?
The purpose of flood plain zoning is to limit (not eliminate) the
costs of flooding. Property on the 10-year flood line can be expected
to encounter a flood once every 10 years, while property located
on the 100-year flood line can be expected to encounter a flood only

once every 100 years. Thus, the long term costs of flood relief for
property on the 100-year flood line will be less than these costs for
property on the 10-year flood line.
If restrictions of equal severity are imposed within the area
called the "flood plain," more of the burden of this cost limitation
will fall on property in the lower probability area than in the
higher. However, if the severity of the restrictions is decreased as
the flood danger decreases, each area of the flood plain will bear
a proportional burden of the cost limitation.
To illustrate this, assume that all costs of floods are borne by
the community. Further assume that equally productive property
on the 10 and 100-year flood lines can be expected to incur $1,000 of
flood danage at each flood occurrence. Since the community at
51. Johnston v. City of Claremont, 49 Cal. 2d 826, 323 P.2d 71 (1971).

See generally 1 E. YoKLEY, ZONING LAw AN

1965).
52. 24 Cal. App. 3d at 315, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 96.

PRAcTIcE § 2-12 (3d ed.

large pays for floods, the value of these parcels to their owners is
equal. In the next 100 years, the expected flood costs will be
$10,000 for the parcel on the 10-year flood line, and $1,000 for the
parcel on the 100-year flood line. If equal restrictions as to a
desired use upon the parcels are imposed, each owner's expected
benefit from that use will be reduced to nothing. To reduce both
owner's interest in this restricted use to zero, because one owner
imposes a $10,000 cost on the community, as compared with the
other owner who imposes a $1,000 cost on the community is to impose an unequal burden of this cost limitation on the parcel located on the 100-year flood line. Thus, the severity of restrictions
should decrease as the probability of a flood decreases.
As long as the goal of flood plain zoning is to reduce flood costs
rather than eliminate them, each property owner within the flood
plain should bear a proportional burden of this reduction. The
way to achieve this is to delineate a series of concentric boundary
lines within which less severe use restrictions are imposed as one
moves into areas of the flood plain having less flood risk. The
question of the number of boundary lines to delineate is important, for divisions based on one-year flood probability intervals or
even five-year intervals seem unwieldly. Too many divisions would
place a severe burden on either the property owner or the local
agency, and strain the capability of the agency in determining the
accurate placement of boundaries. The Cobey-Alquist Act, which
divides the flood plain into two portions-the "designated floodway" and the "restrictive zone" provides a logical zone boundary.
The Cobey-Alquist Act allows prohibition of essentially all structures within the "designated floodway."5 3 It would seem logical
that all structures may not be prohibited outside the "designated
floodway." However, the type of structures and the use to which
they may be put, may be restricted. 54 It is suggested that the "restrictive zone" may be further divided into two zones. Closest to
the body of water would be an intermediate zone beginning at the
boundary of the "restrictive zone" and ending at some arbitrary
point (for example the 75-year flood line). Within this area, restrictions calling for agricultural structures, single family residences, and large minimum lot sizes for residences and businesses
might be imposed. The rational relationship of these restrictions
to the existing danger is, that since flooding can be expected relatively infrequently, some development will be allowed. However,
53. CAL. WATER CODE
54. CAL. WATER CODE

§ 8410(a) (West 1971).
§ 8410(b) (West 1971).
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because these infrequent floods impose costs upon the community,
the responsible agency has decided to limit the extent of these
costs. Production of goods and services within this zone is of value
to society, but since society will be forced to pay an additional
amount for these goods and services at the time of some future
flood, the agency has decided to limit that future expenditure.
The second area within the "restrictive zone" could be called the
flood plain fringe area. This could extend to the 100-year flood
line or further. Here, the restrictions as to minimum lot size and
single family residences could be somewhat relaxed. The rational
relationship of these restrictions to the existing danger is expressed
much the same way as it was expressed in the other areas of the
flood plain. As the flood probability in this fringe area is less than
the probability in the intermediate zone, less flood relief expenditure can be expected in the future. Therefore, less severe restrictions are imposed commensurate with the existing flood danger.
The actual limit of the restrictions is predicated on the agency's
determination of the need for the land compared with the flood
risk.
A developer might argue that he should have the option of paying the expected costs of floods, exempting himself from the restrictions.5 However, the costs of floods are more than financial,
for a developer can do little to pay for the "cost" of lost lives and
disrupted community life. In addition, these future costs are speculative. Flood data yields expected future costs and not exact future costs. The only way of paying for future floods and exempt-

ing property from flood plain restrictions is to raise the level of
the property above that of the flood plain fringe area through filling. It must be recognized that filling flood-prone land could mean
that the raised area's communications and transportation would
still be disrupted severely during a flood, and the raised area
would increase the flood height endangering neighboring property.
However, where practical, the fill option should be left to the developer.
This three-part division of the flood plain does not place a severe
burden on the local agency to determine a multitude of flood fre55. A recent case gave this option to the developer where the "costs"
sought to be avoided were financial. Golden v. Planning Board of Town
of Ramapo, 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291 (1972).

quency boundaries, and should withstand constitutional tests. The
restrictions decrease in severity as the flood danger decreases.
Conformance with the Cobey-Alquist Flood Plain Management Act
can be demonstrated because the act places the burden of weighing
the need for the land and the flood risk upon the local agency.66
If the local agency is to properly weigh these considerations, then
a desire for open space must be a factor in the agency's assessment
of the need for the land. While a three-part division of the flood
plain is suggested as a model upon which to base flood plain restrictions, there are other plans for division of the flood plain that
would work equally well. A local desire for open space should be
a motivating factor in deciding to zone flood plains, because this
desire underscores the costs of overly intensive development in the
flood plain.
ROBERT W. BATCHELDER
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